IWB Blog

A collection of observations, news and resources on the changing nature of innovation, technology, leadership, and other subjects.

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  • “As organizations push to accelerate AI adoption, many leaders are considering a simple idea: Stop treating AI as a tool and start treating it as an employee,” said a recent Harvard Business Review article, “Why You Shouldn’t Treat AI Agents Like Employees.” The HBR article was co-authored by Boston University professor Emma Wiles along with Matthew Kropp, Julie Bedard, Megan Hsu, and Lisa Krayer from the Boston Consulting Group, based on a research study published in a May, 2026 paper, “Putting AI on the Org Chart: Evidence on Delegation and Oversight.”

    The emergence of agentic AI systems makes this framing increasingly plausible. Unlike earlier software tools, agentic systems can operate with greater autonomy, coordinate workflows, make limited decisions, and execute increasingly complex tasks. As a result, some organizations are beginning to describe AI systems as teammates, coworkers, and even employees.

    In particular, a November 2025 report, “The Emerging Agentic Enterprise: How Leaders Must Navigate a New Age of AI,” noted that traditionally, tools automate tasks while people make decisions. But agentic AI increasingly blurs these familiar distinctions by behaving partly like software and partly like a human coworker.

    This hybrid nature creates organizational challenges that traditional management frameworks were never designed to address.

    AI Employees Enter the Workforce

    Management logic assumes relatively clear distinctions between technologies and people: tools automate tasks and employees make decisions; software functions as capital and workers provide labor. Agentic AI increasingly combines several of these characteristics at once. It can automate work while also exercising limited autonomy, interacting with employees, and coordinating activities in ways that resemble human collaboration.

    As organizations integrate these systems into workflows, they must rethink fundamental management processes — including governance, accountability, workforce planning, role design, performance management, and employee training.

    “Organizations are formalizing the role of AI agents in a variety of ways,” noted the article. “For example, they are giving them names and job titles, listing them on an org or work chart, assigning them managers, or referring to them as teammates or employees.”

    “Some of these framing choices are social and symbolic,” adds the article. “Giving AI a human name, for example, gives people a way to address the system and, in some cases, can make it seem more familiar or approachable. Others are governance choices that trigger a set of expectations about authority, accountability, and oversight that the organization applies to its other employees. Whatever the specific practice, each reflects the same broader impulse — moving AI from something employees use to something the organization recognizes as a member of the team in its own right.”

    What’s the impact of humanizing AI?

    Why does it matter whether AI systems are treated as organizational actors rather than tools, and whether managers oversee them like software, delegate to them like human subordinates, or treat them as something distinct?

    To better understand the organizational consequences of this shift, the researchers surveyed 1,261 HR and finance managers. They found that 31% said their organizations already frame AI as a “teammate or employee,” while 23% reported that AI agents appear on organizational charts.

    Participants were then asked to review workplace documents containing errors. The only difference across experimental groups was whether the document had supposedly been drafted by an AI tool, a human employee (“Alex”), or an AI employee (“ALEX-3”).

    The findings revealed several important organizational risks associated with anthropomorphizing AI that require work and governance redesign.

    Accountability becomes blurred. “When AI was framed as an employee rather than as a tool, personal accountability fell by 9 percentage points, while accountability attributed to the AI rose by 8 percentage points.” This is a serious concern because AI systems cannot actually bear responsibility for decisions or errors. Accountability must ultimately remain with humans. When responsibility becomes diffused across teams and AI systems, organizations risk creating environments where people feel less ownership over outcomes and become more willing to overlook problems in AI-generated work.

    Escalation and the burden on others increase. The researchers also found that managers were significantly more likely to escalate work for additional review when AI was framed as an employee. Compared with the AI-tool framing, the AI-employee framing increased requests for additional review by 44%. This creates additional organizational costs through more review cycles, slower workflows, and greater managerial burden, potentially causing so-called AI brain fry. Ironically, anthropomorphizing AI may reduce rather than improve organizational efficiency.

    Quality control declines. Perhaps most concerning, managers exposed to the AI-employee framing identified significantly fewer errors in documents they reviewed. Compared with the AI-tool framing, participants caught 18% fewer errors when AI was framed as an employee. Managers in the AI-employee group were more likely to miss inconsistencies, flawed logic, and factual inaccuracies. These findings suggest that treating AI more like a coworker may unintentionally reduce critical scrutiny of its outputs.

    Professional identity and trust weaken. The study also found important psychological effects.  Managers whose organizations framed AI as a teammate or employee were 13% more likely to express uncertainty about their professional identity, a 7% greater concern about job security, and a 10% lower level of trust in how AI would be used within the organization. These findings suggest that anthropomorphizing AI may unintentionally undermine employee trust and engagement rather than strengthen support for AI adoption.

    Adoption does not meaningfully improve. One of the most striking findings is that treating AI as an employee did not significantly increase willingness to adopt AI tools. Despite common assumptions, managers exposed to AI-employee framing showed no meaningful increase in adoption intent compared with those exposed to AI-tool framing. In practice, adoption appeared to depend far more on managerial expectations and organizational support than on symbolic framing choices.

    Redesigning Work for Responsible Human-AI Collaboration

    The study argues that organizations need to redesign work and governance structures to support more effective human-AI collaboration. As AI systems increasingly handle execution tasks, human roles will shift toward supervision, judgment, relationship management, and handling ambiguity. This transition requires organizations to redefine workflows, clarify oversight responsibilities, and develop new managerial skills.

    Organizations must also rethink accountability structures. Oversight capacity does not automatically scale simply because AI systems generate more output. Companies need explicit rules defining:

    • what AI agents can do autonomously,
    • when human review is required,
    • who intervenes when problems arise,
    • and who ultimately bears responsibility for outcomes.

    The researchers also argue that organizations need new training programs to help employees manage AI systems effectively. Employees must understand not only what AI can do, but also when its outputs should be trusted, challenged, or overridden.

    One of the paper’s most important insights is that AI systems should not simply be mapped one-for-one onto traditional human roles.

    “The concept of ‘employee’ assumes bounded roles, finite human capacity, and a hierarchy in which work is delegated to someone less experienced or knowledgeable,” noted the article. “AI does not share these limits.”

    A single AI agent may operate across multiple workflows simultaneously, while multiple agents may reshape portions of a single job. Treating AI systems simply as human substitutes risks limiting organizational innovation and underestimating how profoundly workflows may evolve.

    At the same time, organizations must remain attentive to the human side of this transformation. Simply asking employees to use AI to do more without redesigning roles thoughtfully is unlikely to strengthen engagement or professional identity. “While 76% of executives believe employees feel enthusiastic about AI adoption, only 31% of individual contributors report the same.”

    The central issue is not whether organizations should deploy AI agents. They clearly will. The more important question is whether companies can redesign work, governance, and accountability structures thoughtfully enough to capture AI’s benefits without weakening human judgment and responsibility.

    Treating AI systems as employees may feel intuitively appealing in an era of increasingly autonomous agents. But anthropomorphizing AI can blur accountability, weaken oversight, and create confusion about the distinct roles humans and machines should play inside organizations.

    “In an agentic system, how work is divided between humans and AI is a design choice,” said the HBR article in conclusion.”As AI improves productivity, it creates the opportunity to redeploy human effort toward higher-value activities where demand is growing. Realizing that opportunity depends on deliberate role design, ensuring that human effort is focused on work that requires judgment, creativity, and ownership — areas that both drive value and reinforce positive engagement.”

    The organizations that benefit most from agentic AI will likely be those that resist simplistic analogies and instead design new operating models that combine the complementary strengths of humans and intelligent systems.

    AI disclosure: I wrote the initial draft of this blog and used ChatGPT for editorial assistance. I remain responsible for the final content.

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  • Hundreds of millions of people are now regularly interacting with systems that can write, analyze, advise, code, and increasingly act on their behalf. Never before have so many people had immediate access to such a powerful intellectual tool. But as AI becomes increasingly ubiquitous, a more fundamental question is emerging: What are we asking AI to do for us — and how much of our thinking and agency are we willing to delegate to it?

    “It’s been three-and-a-half years since generative AI exploded onto the scene,” wrote Marc Zao-Sanders in “How People Are Really Using AI in 2026,” a  Harvard Business Review (HBR) article. published in June, 2026. “In this past year, progress has continued its relentless pace: Vibe coding took off, companies embraced agentic workflows, regular users of ChatGPT hit 900 million and Google’s Gemini surpassed 750 million, and OpenAI posted an $852 billion valuation in its latest funding round.”

    These numbers tell us a great deal about the extraordinary growth of AI. But they don’t tell us what may be the more important story: what hundreds of millions of people are actually doing with these increasingly powerful systems, and how AI might be changing the way we think, work, and interact with each other.

    “Amid the hype and debate over AI’s future, one question continues to stand out: How are people actually using this technology now?” added Zao-Sanders. “This is the focus of AI in the Wild, a longitudinal study carried out by me and Sara Biuk that tracks how we humans are evolving alongside AI.” (more…)

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  • Can AI actually help us become better writers?

    I’ve been thinking about this question since reading “AI Didn’t Make Programming Easier. It Just Made It Differently Difficult,” an article recently published in Communications of the ACM (CACM) by Jeremy Osborn.

    Osborn explained that programming has traditionally been a demanding cognitive activity in which developers rely heavily on working memory and complex mental models. But humans have a limited amount of working memory — the kind of memory we use for keeping track of the concepts and knowledge needed for reasoning and solving problems. Our limited working memory constrains our ability to deal with complex problems when their cognitive demands become too great.

    AI-based coding assistants are changing that relationship. By serving as external memory and analytical resources, they can relieve programmers of some of the cognitive burden associated with remembering syntax, retrieving information, and generating routine code.

    This doesn’t eliminate the need for programmers. Instead, it changes what it means to be a programmer — from primarily a coder toward an overall orchestrating agent who can devote more attention to reasoning, architecture, judgment, and the workings of the overall system.

    Osborn’s CACM article brought to mind an interesting question. What other demanding cognitive activity could AI significantly complement?

    Based on my own experiences, the answer quickly came to mind: writing. (more…)

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  • Will AI eventually replace software developers?

    Over the past few years, predictions have ranged from “The End of Programming,” which argued that “The end of classical computer science is coming, and most of us are dinosaurs waiting for the meteor to hit,” to claims that “ChatGPT Will Replace Programmers Within 10 Years.”

    But something more interesting appears to be happening. AI isn’t eliminating software development. Instead, it’s changing what software developers actually do — shifting the difficult parts of their work away from remembering syntax and writing code toward understanding complex systems, exercising judgment, evaluating AI-generated code, and deciding what should be built in the first place.

    “As GenAI tools handle more routine programming tasks, the software developer’s responsibilities shift to supervising these tools,” wrote Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) professors Mary Shaw, Michael Hilton, and George Fairbanks in “AI Tools Make Design Skills More Important than Ever,” an article in the March-April 2026 issue of IEEE Software. “Accordingly, the software developer’s success will depend on a skillset that emphasizes reading, critiquing, and modifying code rather than writing programs.”

    A few months later, Princeton computer science professor Arvind Narayanan and PhD candidate Sayash Kapoor wrote an essay, “Why AI hasn’t replaced software engineers and won’t” that explained why increasingly capable coding agents have not eliminated the need for software engineers using a simple visual metaphor: the decide-execute-deliver sandwich, which, like any sandwich, consists of three layers:

    • At the top is decision making: framing problems, specifying requirements, and setting priorities.
    • At the bottom is delivery: testing, verification, integration, deployment, and maintenance.
    • In the middle is execution: designing and implementing code.

    “AI has compressed the middle of the sandwich, but has left the two ends largely unchanged,” they wrote. “As long as software development teams are in charge of decision making and accountable for what they deliver, engineers still need to spend time building up a deep understanding of the system.”

    A recent article, “AI Didn’t Make Programming Easier. It Just Made It Differently Difficult,” by Jeremy Osborn, published in the August 2026 issue of Communications of the ACM, helps explain the deeper cognitive changes underlying this transformation. (more…)

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  • On August 11, MIT Nobel laureate economist Daron Acemoglu published his latest book, What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity.

    For much of the second half of the 20th century, liberal democracy appeared to be remarkably successful. Economic growth raised living standards across broad segments of society, technological advances created new industries and good jobs, governments expanded public services, and democratic institutions gave citizens both political rights and a meaningful voice in public affairs.

    But, something has clearly gone wrong.

    Across many advanced democracies, economic inequality has increased, working-class communities have struggled, political polarization has intensified, and confidence in democratic institutions has declined. Why did a political and economic system that once enjoyed such broad support lose the confidence of so many of its citizens?

    “The crisis of liberal democracy is the defining challenge of our age. Our lives would be transformed for the worse without democracy and the basic freedoms that liberal democratic institutions enshrine,” said Acemoglu.

    “The irony is that liberal democracy was once very popular because it delivered what people wanted: shared prosperity, true voice in public affairs, and high quality public services. This crisis is rooted in liberal democracy, in theory and in practice, turning its back on these founding aspirations.”

    Acemoglu argues that “we need a new governing philosophy for democracy” and proposes working-class liberalism as the foundation of that philosophy. It would prioritize shared prosperity and issues that matter to the whole population rather than primarily to a narrow elite. Liberal democracy renewed in this way, he added, would provide the appropriate framework for addressing challenges ranging from AI and climate change to shifting global balances. (more…)

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  • Artificial intelligence is rapidly spreading across the enterprise. Employees are using AI tools to improve their productivity, companies are launching pilots across a growing number of business functions, and executives are investing heavily in AI initiatives. Yet for most organizations, a major gap remains between experimenting with AI and making it a core operational capability.

    Why is that gap proving so difficult to bridge?

    “Organizations across industries have invested heavily in artificial intelligence initiatives, yet the transition from discrete, bounded projects to embedded, organization-wide capability has proven elusive for the vast majority,” said “A Field Study of AI Maturity, Governance, and the Evolving CIO Role,” a report published by Bee360, an IT management consulting company.

    “Understanding why this transition is difficult, and what it actually requires, is a question of both scientific and practical urgency,” the report added. “What does it actually take to make AI a core operational capability — not just a portfolio of pilots?”

    The question reflects what Bee360 calls “one of the defining challenges of enterprise management in the mid-2020s: the gap between AI experimentation and AI operationalization.”

    And increasingly, bridging that gap is becoming a central responsibility of the CIO.

    As part of its analysis, Bee360 cites McKinsey’s “The State of AI in 2025,” a report based on a survey of 1,993 respondents in 105 countries. The survey found that while AI adoption is becoming nearly universal, realizing value from AI at scale remains the exception rather than the rule. “For most organizations, AI use remains in pilot phases.” (more…)

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  • Artificial intelligence is often discussed in terms of faster economic growth, higher productivity, and greater corporate profits. But those are not the only outcomes that matter. Another very important question is whether AI will actually improve human welfare by broadening opportunity, strengthening institutions, and raising living standards across society.

    That question is at the heart of “From Wealth to Welfare: Systemic Complementarities for the Age of AI,” a recent paper by MIT’s Isabella Loaiza and Roberto Rigobon.

    “Over the past century, general-purpose technologies (GPTs), such as electricity, the combustion engine, and the Internet, have played a central role in driving global welfare,” they wrote. “They helped extend life expectancy and civil and labor rights and reduce infant mortality and poverty. However, these transformations did not happen based on the GPTs’ technical capabilities alone. We unlocked their potential by introducing necessary system-level complements into our social and economic systems.”

    Artificial intelligence is the next great general-purpose technology. But, like its predecessors, whether it ultimately enhances welfare for all — or primarily creates wealth for a few — will depend less on the technology itself than on the complementary investments society chooses to make.

    AI is indeed a classic general-purpose technology. As Erik Brynjolfsson, Daniel Rock, and Chad Syverson explained in their influential 2018 paper “The Productivity J-Curve,” GPTs “are the defining technologies of their times and can radically change the economic environment. They have great potential from the outset, but realizing that potential requires larger intangible and often unmeasured investments and a fundamental rethinking of the organization of production itself.”

    The authors called this phenomenon the Productivity J-Curve. Like the letter “J,” productivity often declines during the initial investment phase before rising sharply once organizations have restructured themselves to take advantage of the new technology.

    History provides many examples. Electricity, automobiles, computers, and the Internet all followed this same pattern. Even after they reached commercial viability, it often took decades before businesses and society learned how to reorganize around them and fully realize their benefits. (more…)

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  • When I began writing a weekly blog in May of 2005, I expected that artificial intelligence would someday become one of the subjects I would write about. I didn’t expect that AI would eventually become my editor.

    Writing each weekly post takes many hours. Before I write a single sentence, I spend considerable time thinking through the topic I want to explore. What do I want to say about the topic?  Then comes the drafting, revising, rewriting, and editing. I’ve continued this routine for over two decades because blogging has become much more than a way to communicate ideas. It’s how I explore new subjects, deepen my understanding of emerging technologies, and keep learning.

    From 2012 to 2020, edited versions of my posts were republished in the Wall Street Journal CIO Journal. I often preferred those edited versions to my original drafts, which was hardly surprising given the skill of the Journal’s editors. After that relationship ended, I missed having an experienced editor who could improve the clarity and flow of my writing while preserving my voice. (more…)

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  • “The launch of ChatGPT in 2022 ignited the artificial-intelligence boom — and elicited a chorus of warnings from AI bosses of an impending jobs apocalypse,” said The Economist in “Prepare for an AI jobs apocalypse,” the lead article in its May 16 issue. “Never mind that they have reason to talk up the disruptiveness of their products, or that rich-world employment is near all-time highs — the dark message has landed.”

    Public anxiety about AI-driven unemployment has clearly been rising. Seven in ten Americans believe AI will make it harder to find work, while nearly one-third fear for their own jobs. The concerns have been amplified by a slowdown in hiring for recent college graduates, especially in technology-related occupations such as software development.

    Yet, despite these fears, the historical record offers reasons for caution before concluding that AI will trigger mass unemployment.

    “Labour markets constantly change,” noted The Economist. “Today’s offices would be unrecognisable to a worker from 50 years ago. Never in modern history has technological progress hurt the overall demand for human labour.”

    The article points to the so-called Engels pause, the period from roughly 1790 to 1840 during the early Industrial Revolution when steam-powered mechanization transformed manufacturing. During those decades, British GDP expanded rapidly while working-class wages stagnated, fueling social unrest and movements like the Luddites, who destroyed textile machinery they believed threatened their livelihoods.

    But more recent economic history suggests that technology itself was not the primary cause of stagnant living standards during that period. As The Economist noted in a related Money Talks newsletter, historians now attribute much of the hardship to high food prices driven by wars and trade policies rather than to automation directly reducing labor demand.

    This historical perspective matters because it reminds us that technological change has repeatedly disrupted labor markets without causing permanent mass unemployment.

    Americans are quite pesimistic about the impact of AI on jobs

    “At no time in polling history have Americans been less optimistic about their long-term employment prospects,” wrote The Economist in a second article, “The jobs apocalypse: a (very) short history.” According to one survey, the average person believes there is a 22% chance of losing their job within five years — a higher level of anxiety than during the global financial crisis of 2007–09.

    The fears are increasingly tied to AI. A 2025 Gallup survey found that nearly three-quarters of Americans expect A.I. to slash jobs. And, nearly one in five American workers recently told pollsters that AI or automation is “very” or “somewhat” likely to replace them.

    Public anxiety has also been reinforced by statements from prominent AI executives. Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei has warned that AI could potentially drive unemployment rates to 10–20% within five years. Similarly, Sam Altman, CEO of OpenAI, has said that workers should expect significant changes in their roles as AI systems become more capable and widely adopted.

    But economist are far less apocalyptic

    Many economists reject the so-called “lump of labor fallacy” — the mistaken belief that there is a fixed amount of work in the economy. Throughout modern history, technological progress has simultaneously destroyed some jobs while creating new industries, occupations, and forms of work.

    This question has long fascinated economists. If technology has been automating human labor for over two centuries, why hasn’t automation already eliminated most jobs?

    MIT economist David Autor addressed this question in his influential 2015 paper, “Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation.” The answer, Autor argued, reflects a fundamental economic reality: tasks that cannot be substituted by automation are often complemented by it.

    Automation certainly replaces some human labor. But it also raises productivity, lowers costs, expands demand, and creates opportunities for new kinds of work. Discussions about automation often focus excessively on job substitution while underestimating the complementary relationship between technology and labor.

    Most jobs consist of multiple tasks. Some tasks are relatively easy to automate, while others require judgment, creativity, interpersonal skills, or physical dexterity. Automating routine portions of a job does not necessarily eliminate the entire occupation. In many cases, automation increases the productivity and value of workers by allowing them to focus on the aspects of their jobs where human capabilities matter most.

    Research on technology and employment has often emphasized the jobs lost to automation while paying less attention to the creation of entirely new occupations. To better understand this process, Autor and his collaborators — economists Caroline Chin, Anna Salomons, and Brian Seegmiller — analyzed the emergence of new work in the US economy over the past eight decades in their 2022 paper, “New Frontiers: The Origins and Content of New Work, 1940–2018.”

    Their findings are striking. Roughly 60% of employment in 2018 consisted of occupations introduced since 1940. From 1940 to 1980, much of this new work emerged in mid-skill manufacturing, operations, administrative, and clerical occupations. But from 1980 to 2018, new job creation shifted increasingly toward high-skill managerial, professional, and technical occupations, alongside lower-paid service jobs involving physical and interpersonal tasks such as health aides, food services, and personal care.

    So far, labor-market data does not show evidence of an AI-driven jobs collapse.

    “The labour market certainly is not cracking yet,” said The Economist. Employment rates across OECD countries remain near record highs, unemployment is historically low, and the US continues to add jobs in many AI-exposed industries. The US Bureau of Labor Statistics projects that the economy will add more than five million jobs between 2024 and 2034.

    But history is not always a reliable guide to the future. Today’s AI systems are improving at extraordinary speed. Advanced models can now perform coding, writing, research, and reasoning tasks that seemed out of reach only a few years ago. AI agents are proliferating rapidly, and business investment in AI infrastructure continues to surge.

     There is little direct evidence in labor-market data that AI is destroying jobs at scale. But, given the pace of technological progress, The Economist cautions that it would also be unwise to dismiss the possibility of significant disruptions ahead. The more important question may not be whether AI eliminates work altogether, but how quickly labor markets, institutions, and political systems can adapt to large-scale economic reallocation.

    What should governments do?

    This raises difficult policy questions.

    China, for example, has encouraged companies to deploy AI while discouraging layoffs. Other economists have proposed higher taxes on capital or levies on data centers.

    Some proposals focus on slowing technological adoption. But attempts to significantly inhibit technological progress would likely prove counterproductive. AI has the potential to generate enormous benefits — not only economic growth and productivity gains, but also advances in healthcare, scientific discovery, climate research, and poverty reduction.

    Had the Luddites succeeded in halting industrial automation two centuries ago, the world would almost certainly be far poorer today.

    A more constructive approach would focus on helping workers adapt to economic transitions while ensuring that the gains from AI are more broadly shared. If AI substantially increases profits in sectors such as software, semiconductors, and cloud infrastructure, governments could explore tax reforms that capture a portion of these economic rents more effectively.

    At the same time, stronger labor-market adjustment policies could help workers navigate disruptions. Wage insurance programs could cushion income losses during career transitions, while active labor-market policies — such as Denmark’s highly regarded retraining and job-placement programs — could help workers move into new occupations more quickly.

    These policies would improve economic resilience and fairness regardless of AI’s ultimate impact on employment.

    The jobs apocalypse may never arrive. But if governments wait for definitive evidence before strengthening social protections and workforce transition mechanisms, they may find themselves responding too late to potentially profound economic changes.

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  • Earlier this year I wrote a blog about the continuing debate across higher education on whether — and how — university students should be taught to properly use generative AI, “How Should University Students Be Taught the Proper Use of AI.” I mentioned in the blog that the debate about AI reminds me of my own early experiences with computers as a physics student at the University of Chicago in the 1960s — a time when the legitimacy of using computers as a tool for conducting research in physics and other disciplines was also in question.

    At the time, the use of computers for scientific research was still relatively new. My graduate student advisor was professor Clemens Roothaan, one of the pioneers in the use of computers in physics and chemistry research. Some older physics professors looked askance at the growing use of computers, and told me that this wasn’t “real physics” — that is, the kind of pencil-and-paper physics they had grown up with over the past few decades. Their reaction echoes today’s discussions about the proper use of AI-based tools in higher education.

    “As graduates leave our campuses, companies are expecting to welcome a cohort of digital natives who’ll be ready to use AI with confidence,” wrote Miami University management professor Megan Gerhardt in a Harvard Business Impact article, “Higher Ed Is Sending Mixed Signals of AI.” “Instead, they’ll be getting new degree-holders who spent the last four years receiving warnings from at least some of their faculty that AI use is cheating, not a critical skill for their future careers.”

    Gerhardt writes that she sees this gap from two vantage points. As a professor at Miami University where she teaches change management and leadership to undergraduates. And as a consultant and strategist for organizations around the world, for whom she helps reframe their generational challenges as opportunities for innovation and learning.

    “The distance between those two worlds has never felt wider.” As a concrete example of this gap, she cites a faculty meeting earlier this year where several of her colleagues discussed how to shut down the use of generative AI in their classrooms. That same week, one of her corporate clients asked her why their Gen Z interns were reluctant to use their company’s AI platform. “The irony was not lost on me,” she added.

    Students are paying the price for these mixed signals. A recent graduate shared her direct experience: “There was a significant knowledge gap that I only recognized once I began my internships. In many classrooms, AI is stigmatized. However, during my internships, I was strongly encouraged to use it. As a result, I fear that I may struggle to adjust to professional environments.” (more…)

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