Irving Wladawsky-Berger

Is It Possible to Establish Norms for Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace?

In mid-December, the Council on Foreign Relations sponsored a virtual roundtable with Joseph Nye, - former dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, - to discuss his recent Foreign Affairs article The End of Anarchy?: How to Build a New Digital Order. Professor Nye has long been regarded as one of America’s preeminent strategic thinkers and political scientists. In the 1970s he chaired the National Security Council Group on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and over the past decade he’s brought his expertise to the study of conflict and deterrence in cyberspace.

Cybersecurity is an increasingly important aspect of the of US national security strategy, including global trade and the protection of our critical infrastructures. In June of 2021, FBI Director Christopher Wray compared the danger of ransomware attacks on US firms by Russian criminal groups to the September 11 terrorist attacks. And, in a July editorial, the NY times said that ransomware attacks have emerged as “a formidable potential threat to national security,” given “their ability to seriously disrupt economies and to breach strategically critical enterprises or agencies,” urging governments that “It is a war that needs to be fought, and won.”

At an MIT conference in February of 2019, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was asked if we need cybersecurity control agreements with Russia, China and other nations similar to the nuclear arms control agreements that he spent so much time negotiating during the Cold War. Dr. Kissinger replied that for arms control to be effective, the two sides needed to share information and agree to inspections. But such mechanisms are harder to apply in the digital world, because the transparency that was essential for arms control would be very hard to establish for cyber threats. In addition, while controls of physical arms are relatively explicable and negotiable, the variety and speed of cyber attacks make it much harder to develop adequate control agreements.

A Blockchain-based Framework for Safeguarding the Integrity of Real-World Assets

Blockchains first came to light in 2008 as the architecture underpinning bitcoin, the best known and most widely held cryptocurrency. It’s a truly brilliant architecture built on decades-old fundamental research in cryptography, distributed data, game theory and other advanced technologies. The blockchain’s original vision was limited to enabling bitcoin users to transact directly with each other with no need for a financial institution or government agency to certify the validity of the transactions. But, like the Internet and other transformative technologies, blockchain has now transcended its original objectives.

Blockchains are a kind of distributed ledger technologies (DLT), which also include non-blockchain DLTs. Over the past decade, an increasing number of people, including me, consider blockchains and DLTs as major next steps in the evolution of the Internet. In 2016 the World Economic Forum (WEF) named The Blockchain in its annual list of Top Ten Emerging Technologies citing its potential to fundamentally change the way markets and governments work. “Like the Internet, the blockchain is an open, global infrastructure upon which other technologies and applications can be built,” said the WEF. “And like the Internet, it allows people to bypass traditional intermediaries in their dealings with each other, thereby lowering or even eliminating transaction costs.”

The Internet is a general purpose network platform that unlocked huge innovations and economic value by significantly lowering the cost of connections and supporting a large variety of applications. A major reason for its ability to support so many different kinds of applications is that the Internet’s foundations, its TCP-IP layer, has stuck to its basic data-transport mission, i.e., just moving bits around.  It has no idea what the bits mean or what they’re trying to accomplish.

The design decisions that shaped the Internet back in the mid-late 1980s didn’t optimize for security and privacy, or for the ability to authenticate transactions between two or more parties. That’s all the responsibility of the applications running on top of the TCP/IP layer, and they each generally do it their own way, sometimes not at all. Not surprisingly, the lack of standards for security, privacy and transactional integrity have been the biggest challenges facing the Internet in our fast growing digital economy.

What’s the State of Our Digital Technology Revolution?

I first met Carlota Perez in the mid-2000s when she gave a seminar at IBM based on her 2002 bestseller Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages. At the time, we had been living through a series of major changes, - the explosive growth of the Internet, the advent of the digital economy, the dot-com bubble, and the bursting of the bubble. In her excellent presentation Perez explained these turbulent times by positioning them within the historical perspective she wrote about in her book.

If you look at the historical big picture, patterns begin to emerge which serve as a good guide for understanding the past and thinking about the future. Since the onset of the Industrial Revolution we’ve had 5 major technological revolutions, each one lasting roughly 40 to 60 years. First was the age of machines, factories and canals starting in 1771. This was followed by the age of steam, railways, iron and coal, starting in 1829; steel, electricity and heavy engineering in 1875; oil, automobiles, and mass production in 1908, and our present information technology and telecommunications (ICT) digital age starting in 1971.

Technology revolutions are engines of growth, ushering new paradigms for innovation, rejuvenating and transforming the economy, and re-shaping social behavior and the institutions of society. To better understand the dynamics of a technology revolution, we should split it into two different periods, each lasting 20 to 30 years.

A New Measurement Framework for the Digital Economy

Several weeks ago I heard a very interesting keynote presentation by Cambridge professor Diane Coyle at the annual workshop of the Stanford Digital Economy Lab, - What Don’t We Know About Measuring the Digital Economy? Professor Coyle is also a research associate of the UK Economics Statistics Centre of Excellence. In 2017 she was a recipient of the Indigo Prize on how to measure economic activity in the digital economy for her essay Making the Future Count, co-authored with Benjamin Mitra-Kahn.

“GDP captures only market transactions at the price of exchange, and not the welfare gains, externalities, environment, distribution of wealth or innovation which occurs in an economy,” wrote the authors. “Hence almost since its creation in the 1940s it has been criticised for its inability to capture economic welfare. Now changes in the economy, being restructured by digital technology and paying the price for unsustainable growth, make the case for a new measurement framework more pressing than ever. GDP was never an ideal measure of economic welfare and its suitability has been decreasing.”

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) became the accepted international measure of economies in the1940s. While being a good measure for the 20th century industrial economy, GDP is a flawed measure for the 21st century economy. It was suitable when the economy was dominated by the production of physical goods, but GDP doesn’t adequately capture the growing share of services and other intangible assets that now characterize advanced economies. Nor does it reflect important economic activity beyond production, such as income, consumption and living standards.