Irving Wladawsky-Berger

The Social Network Is the Computer

“Human beings have always been a social species,” writes MIT professor Sinan Aral in the opening paragraph of The Hype Machine, his recently published book.  “We’ve been communicating, cooperating, and coordinating with one another since we were hunting and gathering.”  Our increasingly complex social interactions have been the critical factor in the exponential increase of human cranial capacity over the past few million years.  “But today something is different.  Over the last decade, we’ve doused our kindling fire of human interaction with high-­octane gasoline.  We’ve constructed an expansive, multifaceted machine that spans the globe and conducts the flow of information, opinions, and behaviors through society.”

Professor Aral has been studying social media since its beginning in the early 2000s, when it was driven by the idealistic vision of connecting the world and providing free access to information.  The Hype Machine is what he now calls our global social media ecosystem.  This ecosystem has been designed to stimulate and manipulate the human psyche, “to draw us in and persuade us to change how we shop, vote, and exercise, and even who we love.”  His book nicely explains how the social media industrial complex works, how it affects us, and what we can do to help achieve its original vision while avoiding its later perils.  Let me discuss a few of its key points.

Reflections on the Later Stages of Our Careers

I recently read “Your Professional Decline Is Coming (Much) Sooner Than You Think,” an essay in The Atlantic by social scientist and author Arthur C. Brooks.  Brooks essay is a personal reflection on professional careers.  In particular, the essay explains why in July of 2019 at the age of 55, he concluded that it was time to resign his decades-long position as president of the prestigious American Enterprise Institute (AEI) to join the faculty of the Harvard Kennedy School.  I found Brooks’ essay particularly intriguing as a lens through which to reflect on the later stages of my own career; - when I turned 60 in 2005, I started the transition toward my 2007 retirement from my long IBM career by becoming affiliated with MIT and starting to write my weekly blogs.

The essay references the work of Dean Simonton, professor emeritus of psychology at UC Davis, who’s conducted extensive research on the trajectories of creative careers and is one of the world’s leading experts on the subject.

Over the years, Simonton developed a mathematical model that explains the long term variations in the career trajectories of different individuals, as well as the differences in career trajectories across disciplines and domains.  A few parameters account for most individual differences: the age at which the career starts, the career’s initial creative potential, the rates at which new ideas are generated, and the rate at which the ideas become finished results as publications or products.  This simple model can then predict the trajectory of each individual’s career, including the ages of their first, their best and their final contribution.  Simonton confirmed the validity of his model by analyzing the creative output of the careers of over 2,000 scientists and inventors, as well as the output of musicians, painters, authors and other artists.

“[S]uccess and productivity increase for the first 20 years after the inception of a career, on average,” wrote Brooks summarizing Simonton’s results.  “So if you start a career in earnest at 30, expect to do your best work around 50 and go into decline soon after that.  The specific timing of peak and decline vary somewhat depending on the field.”  Other research has found that the likelihood of a major discovery by scientists and investors increases steadily through their 20s and 30s, and then declines through their 40s, 50s and 60s.  While there are outliers, “the likelihood of producing a major innovation at age 70 is approximately what it was at age 20 - almost nonexistent.”

User-Based Free Innovation

In his 2016 book of the same title, MIT professor Eric von Hippel defines free innovation “as a functionally novel product, service, or process that (1) was developed by consumers at private cost during their unpaid discretionary time (that is, no one paid them to do it) and (2) is not protected by its developers, and so is potentially acquirable by anyone without payment - for free.” The book is available as a free download here.

Free innovation is a tightly constrained subset of commons-based peer production, - also known as open, collaborative innovation.  Participants in a commons-based peer production project can do so for monetary gains, either as individual users or as employees of a collaborating company, as has been the case with firms involved in the continuous development of Linux.  In contrast, while free innovation has potentially important economic impacts, it’s fundamentally not about money.

Free innovation is part of the household sector of national economies, carried out by the members of a household for their own consumption, using their own capital and unpaid labor.  “In just six countries surveyed to date, tens of millions of individuals in the household sector have been found to collectively spend tens of billions of dollars in time and materials per year developing products for their own use,” writes von Hippel.

How Will the Pandemic Reshape Labor Markets?

“The COVID crisis appears poised to reshape labor markets along at least four axes: telepresence, urban de-densification, employment concentration in large firms, and general automation forcing,” wrote MIT’s David Autor and Elisabeth Reynolds in a July essay on The Nature of Work After the COVID Crisis.   “Although these changes will have long-run efficiency benefits, they will exacerbate economic pain in the short and medium terms for the least economically secure workers in our economy, particularly those in the rapidly growing but never-highly-paid personal services sector.”

Autor and Reynolds are cochairs of the ongoing MIT Work of the Future task force, whose interim report was published in the (pre-Covid) Fall of 2019.  The report’s overriding conclusion was that the likelihood that AI and automation will wipe out major workforce sectors in the near future was exaggerated.  However, there were very important reasons for concern, in particular, the rising polarization of employment and wage distribution over the past few decades which has disproportionately benefited high-skilled professionals. Our most critical challenge, said the report, isn’t necessarily a lack of jobs, but the low quality of jobs and viable careers available to many workers, particularly those without college degrees.

“Despite our concerns about the distributional consequences of advancing technologies, until the COVID crisis began, we were sanguine about the prospects for ongoing employment growth, even in the face of lackluster wage growth,” said the authors in their July essay.  “In the fall of 2019 we wrote, ‘We anticipate that in the next two decades industrialized countries will have more job openings than workers to fill them, and that robotics and automation will play an increasingly crucial role in closing these gaps’. The COVID crisis has upended our confidence in that prediction - not merely because COVID has generated mass unemployment in the short term, which it has, but also because the postcrisis trajectory now worries us.”